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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

LEONARD SHYRL BROWN AND
ILA DELL BROWN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 940693-CA

-vsPriority No. 12
QUINN CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is poured over to this Court under the
Judicial Code, specifically §78-2a-3(2)(k) , Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

However, no Notice of Appeal has been filed and

Appellee contends this Court has not acquired jurisdiction since
more than thirty (30) days has elapsed since the filing of a final
order.
An ambiguous Notice of Appeal states: "The aboveentitled matter is appealed to the Court of Appeals in the form of
Petition for Writ of Mandamus."

(See Appendix A-l)

The ambiguity was taken from the Notice of Appeal with
the filing of a Docketing Statement (Appendix A-2).

The Docketing

Statement makes it clear the matter is not before the Court on
appeal.

The document is designated:

"Petition for Writ of

Mandamus to Judge David L. Mower, Sixth District Court for Sevier

County."
The Docketing

Statement further uses the following

language:
We appreciate Mr. Butler's raising the
question as to whether this appeal should be
handled as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
and/or Appeal of Right. We address this
issue first in this document. We believe
this should be handled as Petition for Writ
of Mandamus for the following reasons:...
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Identification of Parties
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Leonard Shyrl Brown and Ila
Dell Brown are husband and wife and appearing Pro Se.
Quinn Christensen is the Defendant and Appellee and is
appearing through Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen, Mclff & Chamberlain, his
attorneys.
Issues
1.

Whether this Appellant Court acquired jurisdiction when
Appellants failed to file a Notice of Appeal in
compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

2.

Whether or not a valid judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is a question of law.

is here on the granting of a Summary Judgment.
Froerer Corporation. 813 P2d 104, 107 [Utah 1991]).

2

The case

(Winecrar vs.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS
United States Constitution, Article III, §§2, 3.
26 USCS, §7402, Jurisdiction of District Courts,
28 USCS, §125, Organization of Courts.
28 USCS, §1332, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure,
Statutes of the State of Utah
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended:
§78-2a-3(2)(k)
§78-27-56
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;
Rule 3, Rule 3(d), Rule 4, Rule 29, Rule 29(b)(12), Rule 33.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case
In this case Appellants ask for a Decree Quieting Title
in their favor and against Appellee on a certain parcel of real
property located in Sevier County, Utah.
Appellee had acquired title at a supervised Courtordered sale pursuant to judgment against Appellants who were
designated as the Defendants in an action entitled, "United States
of America, Plaintiff, vs. L. Shyrl Brown and Ila Dell Brown,
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, Civil No. 89C-143J."

3

Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below
Appellee

filed

a Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

Appellants filed separate motions seeking (1) to amend their
Complaint; (2) a summary judgment; and (3) for "status quo".
On June 8, 1994 the District Court entered an Order on
the various motions: (1) authorizing amendment of the Complaint;
(2) granting Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs (Appellants); (3)
denying Appellants' Motions for (a) status quo; and (b) summary
judgment; and (4) vacating "common law lien".
Appellants thereafter filed "Notice of Appeal" in the
form of a "Petition for Writ of Mandamus" on the 14th day of June,
1994 and had the notice served upon Judge David L. Mower (Appendix
A-l) . Thereafter, a Docketing Statement clarifying their actions
in these proceedings was certified to have been mailed on the 2nd
day of July, 1994.

(Appendix A-2)

The Supreme Court poured over this case to the Court of
Appeals for disposition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellee observed notices of a Federal Marshal's

sale of real property owned by the Appellants in Richfield, Sevier
County, State of Utah.
2.

(R.23)

On the 16th day of September, 1993, he attended the

public sale and did bid the sum of $5000 for the described property
which was the highest and best bid received.
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(R.24)

3.

Appellee

requested

that

the

Deputy

Marshal

conducting the sale show his authority to conduct the sale. He was
furnished a certified copy of a Judgment, Order of Foreclosure and
Order of Sale executed by Bruce S. Jenkins, United States District
Judge for the District of Utah, Central Division (R.24 and R.27,
28) a copy of which Judgment, Order of Foreclosure and Order of
Sale is attached as Appendix A-3.
4. Appellee paid the $5000 consideration to the office
of the United States Marshal and received a receipt therefor.
(R.32)

A copy of the receipt is attached as Appendix A-4.
5.

The United States Marshal did deliver to Appellee

a Certificate of Purchase for the property described (R.34) which
is attached as Appendix A-5 and by which he was advised that the
sale would become absolute after a period of six (6) months unless
redeemed.
6. The property was not redeemed on or before the 16th
of March, 1994. (R.24)
7.

On the 26th day of March, 1994, the United States

Marshal issued to Appellee a United States Marshals Deed (R.37)
conveying the entire interest of Plaintiffs in the real property
described

and at issue in these proceedings, which deed was

recorded April 5, 1994 in Book 286, Page 68 of the records of
Sevier County, Utah, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A-6.
8.
this

Appellee

On the 27th day of April, 1994, Appellants served
with

a

Complaint

seeking

to

quiet

title

and

collaterally attacking the federal judgment and slandering title
5

to other property of Appellee, all of which required the Appellee
to incur attorney fees and costs as well as personal expense in
defending this pro se action.
9.

(R.l-5)

Appellants did file a separate document identified

as a pleading in this case and entitled, "common law commercial
lien" which lien identified other property owned by Appellee in
Sevier County, Utah, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix
A-7, having been filed in evidence on the 24th day of May, 1994.
The "common law commercial lien" prepared and filed by
Appellants

listed

other

properties

owned

Christensen, in the County of Sevier.
all

of

Christensenfs

property

specifically and then stating:

by

by

Appellee, Quinn

It slandered the title of
describing

the

property

"We seek a judgment against

Christensen for $1000 per day for each day we are denied property
rights and estimate the value in good faith."
The document further stated:

"This lien is attached to

the above-described property in anticipation of a judgment to be
secured by demandants from the Sixth District Court of Sevier
County, State of Utah, Brown, et al. vs. Christensen. Civil No.
940600108QT..."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts relied upon in support of Appellee1s Motion
for Summary Judgment were uncontroverted.
Appellee acquired title to the real property at issue
by reason of a Judgment, Order of Foreclosure and Order of Sale
issued in an action by the United States of America, Plaintiff, vs.
6

L. Shyrl Brown and Ila Dell Brown, Defendants.
The Federal District Court

is a Court of general

jurisdiction for the District of Utah and had personal jurisdiction
over both Defendants and jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action.
The Appellants did not in any way challenge directly the
judgment decision and order of sale of the property issued by the
Federal District Court but do now seek to challenge the judgment
by collateral attack and the filing of a quiet title action.

A

judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter is not subject to collateral attack.
Since

Appellants1

action

and

this

Petition

for

Extraordinary Writ is frivolous and intended to harass Appellee,
Appellee is entitled to an order dismissing the appeal or the
Petition for Extraordinary Writ with an order that Appellee be
reimbursed for costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS FAILED TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL
AND FOR THAT REASON THIS COURT IS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION.
An ambiguous document filed by Appellants entitled,
"Notice of Appeal" states: "The above-entitled matter is appealed
to the Court of Appeals in the form of Petition for Writ of
Mandamus."

(See Appendix A-l)
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The ambiguity was taken from the Notice of Appeal with
the filing of a Docketing Statement (Appendix A-2).

The Docketing

Statement makes it clear the matter is not before the Court on
appeal.
The

document

is designated

"Petition

for

Writ

of

Mandamus to Judge David L. Mower, Sixth District Court for Sevier
County•"
The Docketing

Statement

further uses the following

language:
We appreciate Mr. Butler's raising the
question as to whether this appeal should be
handled as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
and/or Appeal of Right. We address this
issue first in this document. We believe
this should be handled as Petition for Writ
of Mandamus for the following reasons:...

The Appellants were also required to designate on the
face of their brief a priority of argument as required by Rule 29
of

the

Utah

designated

Rules

of

Appellate

a priority of 12.

Procedure.

The

Appellants

Rule 29(b)(12) designates the

proceedings as:
(12) Original Writ proceedings.
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide:
An appeal may be taken from a district...to
the Appellate Court with jurisdiction over
the appeal from all final orders and
judgment...by filing a Notice of Appeal with
the Clerk of the trial court within the time
allowed by Rule 4.
Rule 4 provides:
The filing shall be within 30 days from the

date of entry of the judgment
appealed from.

or order

Rule 3 (d) also provides for the content of notice on
appeal:
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice
of appeal shall specify the party or parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed
from; shall designate the court from which
the appeal is taken; and shall designate the
court to which the appeal is taken.
The total notice given in the instrument

filed by

Appellants is:
Please take notice, that the above-entitled
matter is appealed to the Court of Appeals
in the form of a Petition for Writ of
Mandamus.
The foregoing does in no way designate the judgment or
order or part thereof, appealed from.

The notice requests relief

"in the form of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus."
It has been uniformly held that without notice of appeal
being given, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the
matter.

(Yost vs. State, 640 P2d 1044 [Utah 1981])
The following cases hold the Supreme Court cannot take

jurisdiction over an appeal which is not timely brought before it;
and an untimely appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
(Burgers vs. Maiben, 652 P2d 1320 [Utah 1982];

Bowen vs. Riverton

Citv. 656 P2d 434 [Utah 19821 : Nielson vs. Stoker. 669 P2d 390
[Utah 1983]).
Since the question of jurisdiction of a court can be
raised at any time or raised upon a court's own motion, these
9

proceedings should be dismissed with an award to Appellee for an
action frivolously brought, contrary to Rule 33, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and in accordance with §78-27-56, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, which also provides for costs and
expenses in case of an action brought frivolously or in bad faith.
POINT II
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
APPELLEE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.

A)

A)

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH WAS ENTITLED TO
FULL CREDIT SINCE IT IS A COURT OF
GENERAL
JURISDICTION
AND
HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND
SUBJECT MATTER.

B)

THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURT
CANNOT
BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH WAS ENTITLED
TO FULL CREDIT SINCE IT IS A COURT OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION AND HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
PARTIES AND SUBJECT MATTER.
The Federal District Court of the State of Utah was

created by the United States of America pursuant to Article III of
the United

States Constitution.

The Court was

specifically

established by the use of the following language:
Section 1. The judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in the Supreme Court
and such inferior courts as Congress may,
from time to time, ordain and establish.
Section 2. The judicial power shall extend
to all cases in law and equity. . .
10

Pursuant to the Code of Laws of the United States of
America, Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. §1332 sets
forth:
The District Court shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions...
The Federal District Court granting the judgment and
order against Appellants was organized pursuant to 28 USCS, §125:
"Utah constitutes one judicial district comprising two divisions.11
In addition to the foregoing general powers, the Federal
District

Court

was

granted

specific

jurisdiction

over

the

enforcement of Internal Revenue laws by §26, USCS 7402, entitled
Jurisdiction of District Courts:
(a) To issue orders, processes and judgments.
The district courts of the United States at
the instance of the United States shall have
such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil
actions, writs and orders of injunction and
of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers,
and such other orders and processes, and to
render such judgments and decrees as may be
necessary or appropriate for the enforcement
of the internal revenue laws. The remedies
hereby provided are in addition to and not
exclusive of any and all other remedies of
the United States in such courts or otherwise
to enforce such laws.
The foregoing citations are to establish the fact that
the United States Federal District Court with Judge Bruce Jenkins
presiding, did have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
taxes.

The judgment was issued for the collection of income

Further, the Federal District Court did have the authority

to issue orders, processes and judgments necessary to collect the

11

judgment and, in addition, had general authority to adjudicate
interests as between the Defendants in real property and to issue
such supervised orders of sale or execution as were required.
The Judgment and Order of Sale of property has not been
directly challenged by Appellants.

Appellants argue the judgment

was not valid against them basically because it was oppressive and
cite many federal cases which do not appear to be relevant.
It

is particularly

noteworthy

that

the

Defendants

(Appellants herein) do not, by affidavit or otherwise, challenge
jurisdiction of the Federal Court and do acknowledge they appeared
and participated in the proceedings.

A certified copy of the

federal judgment (R.27,28, See Appendix A-3) recites:
This matter came on for trial before the
United States District Judge, Bruce S.
Jenkins, on February 4 and 5, 1991 with Kirk
C. Lusty and John Frickel representing the
United States and L. Shryl Brown and I la Dell
Brown appearing prose.
The Federal Court did enter a specific order with regard
to the judgment granted and the foreclosure of the Federal Tax
Liens on the real property which was owned by one or both of the
Defendants.
As seen from the Judgment and Order of Sale issued, the
District Court supervised an Order of Execution over the subject
property.
A court of general jurisdiction has the inherent power
to enforce its orders.
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B) THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.
Appellants have not sought to attack the judgment
granted by the Federal District Court by appeal or by motion but
now seek to attack it collaterally by alleging they can relitigate
the matter in a separate court by filing a quiet title action.
The uniform rule adopted unanimously throughout the
United States is that a judgment rendered by a Court having
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, "is not open
to contradiction or impeachment" by collateral attack.

(See 49

CJS, §401, Collateral Attack, and the various state citations
therein.)
The Utah case of Intermill vs. Nash. 75 P2d 157 (1938),
reviewed the question of collateral attack.

The Court first

defined the term by stating:
The term "collateral attack" means the
questioning of the validity of a judgment in
a
collateral proceeding; that is, a
proceeding other than the one in which the
judgment is entered, and which is not
brought, instituted or maintained for the
express purpose of modifying, setting aside,
cancelling or enjoining the execution of a
judgment.
The Court then stated:
On collateral attack the invalidity of the
judgment must appear upon the face of the
record. A judgment that is voidable cannot
be attacked collaterally.
And further stated:
Any question, therefore, as to jurisdiction,
or as to the validity of the judgment, which
13

does not show upon the face of the record
must be raised and brought to the attention
of the court by appropriate pleadings.
Errors in the judgment, or judgments
erroneously entered, where the court had
jurisdiction of the res and of the parties,
can only be reviewed or corrected by motion
in that proceeding or bv appeal.
Intermill. supra, did further hold that in collateral
proceedings the question of voidability must be raised as the
burden of the party asserting it and stated:
If it
(record) is silent, then the
presumption follows that what ought to have
been done was not only done, but rightly
done. In a collateral attack, the omission
to affirm the jurisdictional fact upon the
record will be supplied by the presumption
that the court acted with due authority, and
its judgment will be valid as though any fact
necessary to jurisdiction affirmatively
appeared. (Utah cases cited omitted.)
The doctrine of Intermill. supra, was reaffirmed by the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Bawden vs. Pearce, 414 P2d 578
(1966) which was a matter filed by landowners brought to enjoin
the planning commission, its members and Director of Building
Inspection
construction

Department

from

issuing

of a shopping center.

further

permits

for

the

The* moving parties were

Plaintiffs in a prior action where a judgment was granted requiring
a Writ be issued directing the Salt Lake County Commission and its
members, the Salt Lake Planning Commission and its members, and the
Chief Building Inspector of Salt Lake County to consider and
process the application for construction.

14

The Court dismissed the second action stating:

"The

relief sought by Appellants herein, if granted, would void that
judgment in a collateral proceeding.

This cannot be done."

It

cited Intermill, supra.
The same principle set forth in Intermill was again
reviewed and approved in Olsen vs. Board of Education of the
Granite School District. 571 P2d 1336 (Utah 1977).
The Supreme Court of Utah, through Justice Hall stated:
The principles of res adjudicata apply to judgments
in condemnation proceedings as to matters
therein litigated. Just as the rules
governing the application of the doctrine of
res adjudicata to judgments generally, the parties
hereto are precluded as to all matters that
were put in issue or might have been put in
issue, or were necessarily implied in the
decision...The doctrine renders a final
judgment, on the merits, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon the
parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation
of the same issues.
[4]
The general rule of law is that a
judgment may not be drawn in question in a
collateral proceeding and an attack upon a
judgment is regarded as collateral if made
when the judgment is offered as the basis of
a claim in a subsequent proceedings.

[5]
A judgment may not be impeached in
collateral proceedings, by a party or privy
to it, for fraud, collusion, or false
testimony.
This rule is particularly
applicable when the fraud was actually tried
in the proceedings or so involved that it
might have been tried.
Since the original judgment and order was from a Federal
District Court, it should be noted that in the case of Edmonston
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vs. Sisk. (1946) CA 10, Okla. (156 F2d 300), the Court held:
The truth of a Writ of Execution cannot be
inquired into collaterally, but only upon
motion to set it aside.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant has incurred attorney fees, expenses and
costs in this action which can only be deemed as an action brought
in bad faith and governed by §78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, or was frivolously brought contrary to Rule 33, URAP.
Since the Appellants are representing themselves, they
are held to the same standards as though they were qualified
attorneys and required to recognize their action as ill-conceived.
They are required to recognize that the District Court below had
no jurisdiction to review a federal judgment entitled to full faith
and credit. They are required to recognize that they have no right
or authority to slander the title to other real property owned by
the Appellee by filing what they designate as a "common law lien."
They are also required to recognize that this Court has no
jurisdiction over this "appeal" because of their failure to file
a Notice of Appeal.
They are further required to know that their slanderous
statements concerning Judge David L. Mower in their request for an
extraordinary writ from this Court directing him to make decisions
contrary to law, are not only inappropriate but without merit.
For the reasons stated in this brief, the Appellee
requests the appeal of Appellants be dismissed and that he be

16

granted his costs and expenses incurred.

In the event this Court

elects to review matters here on appeal, Appellee requests that the
final orders heretofore entered by David L. Mower, District Judge,
be affirmed and Appellee be awarded his costs and expenses incurred
in these proceedings.
The Affidavit of Tex R. Olsen concerning costs and
expenses incurred in these proceedings is attached as Appendix A8 for the consideration of the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN
BY
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,- - -. -- , Tex R. Olsen
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellee were mailed to Leonard Shyrl Browm, Appellant,
490 North 100 West, Richfield, Utah (84702) and four (4) copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were also mailed to Ila Dell Brown,
Appellant, 490 North 100 West, Richfield, Utah (84701) by U. S.
Regular Mail, postage prepaid, on this
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fo

day of December, 1994.

APPENDIX

6TH

DISTRICT COURT
sc</,n- -•'•'TV

Leonard Shyrl Brown
Ila Dell Brown
490 North 100 West
Richfield, Utah 84701
801-896-4864

CLERK

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Leonard Shyrl Brown,
Plaintiffs,
v

et al.r
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 940600108QT

Quinn Christensen,

Judge David L. Mower

Defendant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, the above entitled matter is appealed
to the Court of Appeals in the form of Petition for Writ of
Mandamus.
DATED this

/T

day of June, 1994.

yd. j&l*umJ
Ila D. Brown
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I mailed a copy of this Notice to Tex R. Olsen,
Attorney, P. O. Box^100, Richfield, Utah, postage prepaid, U.S.
Mail, on this
/a day of June, 1994.

Leonard Shyr

^Leonard Shyrl Brown

APPENDIX A-1

Leonard Shyrl Brown
Ila Dell Brown
490 North 100 West
Richfield, Utah 84701
801-896-4864
in person
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Leonard Shyrl Brown and Ila
Dell Brown,

: DOCKETING STATEMENT
:

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v

Subject to Assignment to
the Court of Appeals
Appellate Court No. 940320

Quinn Christensen,
Defendant and Appellee.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER, SIXTH
DISTRICT COURT FOR SEVIER COUNTY.
We appreciate Mr. Butler's raising the question as to
whether this appeal should be

handled as a Petition for Writ

of Mandamus or and appeal of right?
in this document.

We address this issue first

We believe this should

be handled as a

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS for the following
1.

reasons:

The record decisions of Judge Mower are false,

presumptive and hopelessly

inadequate for appeal.

We believe

the record decisions and orders could not be that bad unless
there was actual bias and prejudice on the part of the judge.
The false statements must be corrected.

The presumptions must

be voided and replaced with fact and law.

The court decisions

must include decisions on all issues of applicable law.

These

things are necessary in the interest of justice
a.

Judge Mower recognized our request
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to amend our

the allegations,

(1) lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court

over our persons, (2) lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court
over

the real property owned by Ila Brown and (3) there is

no law
order

making Leonard LIABLE for any federal tax.

Judge Mower's

states at p. 5,

1. Plaintiffs' Motion to amend their Complaint and
specifically allege that the identified Marshal's Sale
of Plaintiffs property was a "judicially-supervised sale"
is hereby granted and considered in making the orders
hereinafter following.
The Order bears no relationship to our position whatsoever.
The Order is an outright lie.

We allege lack of jurisdiction

of the foreign jurisdiction court over our persons, over Ila's
real property and over subject matter.

We proved lack of

jurisdiction in the lower court by our uncontested Memoranda.
We never alleged the

sale was a "judicially-supervised sale."

We proved the alleged sale was in direct violation of the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act and in direct violation of several parts
of Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because the remainder

of the order was "granted and considered in making the orders"
and because the statement in #1 quoted above is absolutely false
and fraudulent the remainder of Judge Mower' order is false
and fraudulent.

The record must be corrected and the fraud

removed for appeal because of the higher presumption that the
lower court record is correct.
b.

Judge Mower refers to Ila's property as "Plaintiffs'

property."

That is the second absolute lie in the same sentence

we quote in #a above.

Ila is the sole owner of the real property

APPENDIX A-2

years old.

The deed is not difficult to read and is uncontested.

If there was an objection to the deed we could have verified
it in Sevier County Recorder's Office only a short distance
from the court room in the same building.

Judge Mower should

be ordered to state clearly and in detail his (alleged) authority
and rationale for destroying Ilafs recorded deed and rights
to the real property.
c.

There is an undecided MOTION to strike the foreign

judgment for failure to pay the filing fee (Utah Code,
21-1-5(7 0) ) pending before Judge Mower.

He should be ordered

to decide the issue.
d.

Judge Mower refused to NOTICE Ilafs deed to her

property recorded in 1972.

We believe this to be a most

important fact and was never considered.

The record is silent

on that issue.
e.

Judge Mower refused to allow us to mount what he

called a "collateral" attack on the foreign judgment.

Our attack

on the foreign judgment is based on violations of law, fraud,
lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law in the
foreign jurisdiction court.

He therefore ruled in direct

opposition to precedent established by this court and the Court
of Appeals.

(See Data Management Systems v EDP Corp, 709 P2d

377 (Utah 1985); Holm v Smilowitz, 840 P2d 157, 164 (Utah App.
1992); Intermill v Nashf 75 P2d 157, 160 (Utah 1938))
was the only case cited by Judge Mower.

Intermill

The court should ORDER

the lower court hear and decide our numerous attacks on the
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and barriers to granting FULL FAITH AND CREDIT in Utah to the
foreign judgment.
f.
on law.

Our quiet title action is based almost entirely

We have attached a number of laws Judge Mower refused

to decide to our Petition.

Even this list is not exhaustive.

Judge Mower refused to NOTICE and DECIDE the law, creating
overwhelming bias and prejudice against Plaintiffs.

If there

is to be justice in this matter, we believe this court must
ORDER Judge Mower to specifically NOTICE and DECIDE THE LAWS.
Only then will the lower court record be perfected for appeal.
g.

We understand this court WILL NOT hear appeals unless

the issues appealed are raised and DECIDED in the lower court.
We have done and are doing everything we possibly can to make
certain the record proves we tried to raise the numerous issues
of law in the lower court while demanding decisions on these
same issues of law.

We understand it is the duty of Judge Mower

to decide the issues of law without bias or prejudice against
Plaintiffs.

A part of the record is this Petition for Writ

of Mandamus to ORDER Judge Mower to DECIDE the laws presented.
If the courts will not NOTICE and DECIDE the issues of law we
raise, our civil action is hopelessly prejudiced.
h.

The record is so bad that we ask this court to take

NOTICE that Judge Mower has refused to place the alleged judgment
of the U.S. District Court in that class of judgments which
can not be directly enforced by the foreign jurisdiction but
which must seek FULL FAITH AND CREDIT for enforcement by a Utah
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i.

We have filed our NOTICE OP DEFAULT with the court.

More than ten (10) days have expired after Judge Mower was
personally served a copy of our Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
No objections or counter argument have been filed to this date
to our knowledge by either Judge Mower or interested party Quinn
Christensen.

Therefore, the court should grant our demanded

relief.
j.

Grounds for our Petition for Writ of Mandamus are

more fully set down in our Petition.
2.

This Petition for Writ of Mandamus is absolutely

necessary to correct the lower court record and to perfect the
record for appeal, if necessary.
3.

It appears this case may create considerable precedent.

We can not find any case closely related
in this civil action.

to the fact or law

We presume the reason is that other

foreign judgments have followed the prescribed procedure at
law for gaining full faith and credit and enforced according
to the laws of Utah.

We therefore urge the court to aid us

by Mandamus in correcting the lower court record and in
perfecting the case for appeal, if necessary.
4.

On the other hand, we firmly believe that if Judge

Mower is ORDERED by this court to'NOTICE and DECIDE the issues
of law we raise, without prejudice to Plaintiffs, he will reverse
his own decision bringing a quick end to the quiet title action
without the extensive expenditure of time, money and energy
which would be required in an appeal of right.
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justice, decide the law, correct the record and perfect the
lower court record.
6.

we can not find a court which will protect Ila's rights

to her property and our rights to personal property therein.
Numerous people have entered and exited Ila's property.

We

have definite indications that personal property has been stolen
from the building.

We demand protection of our property.

We

DEMAND THAT THIS COURT ACT IMMEDIATELY TO PROTECT OUR PROPERTY
PENDING A FINAL DECISION ON THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY. We
demand immediate action.
THEREFORE, for the above reasons or any of them, this appeal
should be considered as;a Petition for.«.Writ of Mandamus and
the court should grand the relief we demand.
We now complete the outline docketing statement even though
we consider it irrelevant for we understand the Petition for
Writ of Mandamus requires no special form.
T.

Date of entry of judgment June 15, 1994.

2.

The court has not yet ruled on prejudgment motions,

a. Amendment of judgment
1994.

- May 31, 1994.

b. Stay - May 31,

(thus, our prbperty and rights to property are

unprotected,

c. Strike the foreign judgment for failure to

pay the filing fee - June 3, 1994. d. Analysis of fritSftaiil
^_Nash - June 6, 1994.

Our objections to the Order were filed

June 17, 1994.
3.

Rule 54(b) URCP appears to not apply.
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The only decision

foreign judgment or grounds of law, fraud, lack of jurisdiction
or lack of due process of law.

(See p.3, #1(e))

The purpose

of this Petition is to correct and perfect the record of the
lower court.
4.

Notice of appeal was filed June 14, 1994.

5.

This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code, 78-2-2(2),

extraordinary writs.
6.

Trial court.

Sixth District Court of Sevier County,

Judge David L. Mower, presiding.
7.

Statement of facts and questions in on pages 1-5 above.

8.

Review see #3 immediately above.

In addition this

court should consider that: (1) Notice of appeal was filed on
June 14, 1994.

(2) Judge Mower was personally served a copy

and a copy of Petition for Writ of Mandamus on June 14, 1994.
(3) Judge Mower's judgment was filed June 15, 1994 according
to the copy sent to us by this court.

Therefore, jurisdiction

had transferred to the higher court prior to the filing of Judge
Mower's Order.

Therefore, the ORDER is invalid in want of

jurisdiction.
9.

The court should take care^see that all applicable

laws are noticed and decided, that the lower court record is
corrected and that the lower record is perfected for appeal.
The court should also take care that we are granted immediate
relief and that our property is.protected from invasion, trespass
theft or other unlawful acts.

This case may become important

precedent for future cases and the court should take care that
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the record is true and correct and all appropriate laws are
noticed and decided according to law.
10.

Determinative law.

Determinative law is cited in

our petition but is not necessarily exhaustive.

Determinative

cases for purposes of this petition are found on p. 3, 1(e)
above.
11.

None.

12.

None.

^J£OJ
U.J&U^n^
Ila D. Brown

Leonard Shyrl Brdwn
Plaintiffs, Appellants,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify I mailed a copy of this document to Judge David L.
Mower, Sevier County Courthouse, 250 South Main, Richfield,
Utah 84701 and to Tex R. Olsen, P.O. Box 100, Richfield, Utah
84701, postage prepaid, U. S. Mail, on this
j2day of July,
1994.

Leonard Shyrl Brown
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DEE V. BENSON (0289)
United States Attorney
Room 466, U.S. Courthouse
350 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 524-5682
KIRK C. LUSTY
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 683
Ben Franklin Station
Washington/ D.C. 20044
Telephone: (202) 307-6531

FILED.NUN!T£0 STATES DISTRICT
C0!i>T. CisrRicr OP UTAH,

Ih«»bycartBy thaitfv a >exed dreumwiffi|)tjy i,p/ti" *•'"'?
and correct oopy at the original on We In tro iMm-r.-^. y ,t.v^—
ATTEST: MAflKUS&ZMMER
Cte*. U.S. District Court
District or Utttft

twnwwJfe**^

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 89C-143J

L. SHYRL BROWN, et al.,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT, ORDER OF
FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE

This matter came for trial before United States District
Judge Bruce S. Jenkins on February 4 and 5, 1991 with Kirk C.
Lusty and John Pirkle representing the United states and L. Shyrl
Brown and Ila Dell Brown appearing pro ue.
entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order.

The Court previously
Based on the

Memorandum Opinion and Order judgment is entered as follows:
1,

Against L. Shyrl Brown and in favor of the United States

in the sum of $190,404.89, plus interest and statutory additions
as provided by law.
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2. Foreclosing the Federal tax liens on the real property
located at 46 West 100 North, Richfield, Utah. Tho legal
description of that property is:
ft a i» A i Ri ^ f ield city Survey, N 46.9 ft., E 16
Sprox^aLJvliflA," 1 6 / t ' 8 i n -t 0 b e 5 - containing
NortSwS? ZrXJi1* •?»«-** ^ e t , situated in the
e
th
Southw
25 ToSSshiS
2
|
?
n
°
^
?
* * t garter of Section
S Uth
MeridiSl? P
°
' R a n * e 3 W e s t ' s a l t 1**8 Base and
3.

That the United states Marshal sell the real property

identified in paragraph 2 and distribute the proceeds as follows:
(a) First, to the costs of such sale;
(b) second, to the costs of this action;
one-hi?r g'Se *&fi&**£STttt
*}?D e l 1 B r o ™ and
tax liabilities J ^ ^ ^ , ^ ^ ^ ^
*"* ^
^
(d) Any regaining sum to defendant L. Shyrl Brown.
4. This Order of Sale shall acta s a Writ of Execution.
Dated this . ^ y , day of . S ^ _ V ^
, 1991#
BV THE COURT

BRUCE S. JEtfKIN
UNITED STATES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that service of the foregoing
(proposed) JUDGMENT, ORDER OF FORECLOSURE AND.ORDER OF SALE has
this —
...*!.•_I day of September, 1991 been made on opposing parties
T V /•/*• <
by mailing a true and correct copy to the following:
I». Shyrl Brown
11a Dell Brown
180 North loo East
Richfield, Utah 84701

KIRK C. LUSTY
Trial Attorney

TZax Division

U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 683
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.c 20044
Telephone: (202) 307-6531

APPENDIX A-3

wiHcu uiuict iviarsnais
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service
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RECEIPT
District of
1. RECEIVED OF:

2. DATE

G>A \\VNSN
3.

^-NU-^TS

T W\^-V \Vr\e-se- r\

4.

COURT/CASE NUMBER OR PURPOSE OF COLLECTION

PfY^Vx

^vccx\c\^e

^OjCSNt^'N

o&. Y ^ ^ V ^ ^ ^ \
* TOTAL

(Note: if check is received in mail and is for process, place in USM-286
folder)

'

g

^

g

^

.

^

6.VRECEP/ED BY (U.S. Marshals Service Official)

ts&^

COPY l-REMITTER

l f '.

AMOUNT

FORM USM-303 (Rev. 2/92)

*~-~:^-%jQj>*
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~
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N

U.S. Department of Justice
United States Marshals Service

CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE
89-C-143J
United States of America

&rtii?& §tatea nl A m e r i c a ,

ss:
District of

I,

Utah

vsm

L. Shyrl Brown, e t a l . ,

Eugene H. Davis

, United States Marshal of the
, do herel
hereby certify that by virtue of a
District of
Utah
judgment urder or Foreclosure
TVfgfr-frfC0UTt
irtain W¥H&&&n&em&i issued out of and under the seal of the United States
Utah
24th
day
>r said
District of
, on the
f
September
, A.D. 19 91 9 in favor of the United S t a t e s of America

id

, Plaintiff
id against

L« Shyrl Brown and I l a Dell Brown

., Defendant
Angus*• me directed and delivered, I did, on the
, A.D. 19 93
12th
day of.
16th
, A.D. 19 93
vy upon, and did, on this the
day of. September
11 at public sale (in the manner provided by law, and after duly advertising the same, according to the
atute in such case made and provided), to
Quinn Christiensen

of

Central Vallev
, in the
utah
for the sum
ounty of
, State of
f Five Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($5,000,00)
, dollars,
he being the highest and best bidder, and that being the highest sum bid for the same, at said sale,
1 the right, title, and interest of the said Defendant L. shyrl ttrotjn and Tia TIMI ^-mr.™

F which tihey w ere seized or possessed on the
, date of the said levy, or at any
?fl j,d
3ie afterwards, of, in, and to all the following-described land situated in the
Utah
Block 45, Plat "A"

State
County nf Sevier
.of
l0 w j t : Comm. at a point 13.5 ft, E of SW Cor of Lot

Richfield City Survey, N 48.9 ft,. E 16 ft 8 in. S 48.9 ft.r
16 ft. 8 in., to beg, containing approximately 818 square fppf, g-ft-nat-pd -fn HIP
orthvest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 25. Township 23 South. Range 3
est, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

together with the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging,
&nb 3 bo further certtfp, that the purchase money so bidden at said sale has been paid to me, and that
the said sale will become absolute, and that the said purchaser or
his
assigns, will be entitled to
a deed of conveyance of the said land on the 16th day of March, 1994
unless the same shall be sooner redeemed, according to the Statute in such case made and provided.
45toen unber mp fjanb, this

27th

day of

Z > & . D . 19 93

September

iNrplp STATES MARSHAL
UNITEP
For the.

Utah

District of \
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UNITED STATES MARSHAL'S DEED
tEllfe KltbentUre,

is made and entered into t h i s Z ^ T d a y of
Utan

between the United States Marshal for the District of

Z33UJ4

March

—

I*>1

-^-J^'c}%^f^mdX0

Christ evs&n ^ , •„ , ,
sr
"United States Marshal"] in his official capacity, and Quinn-C-hrl^^fff^sw
of the Central V a l l e v — ^
County of

Sevier

and

of the

County of

Wittltifittt),

that on thk

for the District of

24thj a y n f

September

, 1 9 J I , in the United States Cd

Utah

__

11

.

Plaintiff, recovered a judgment against L. Shyrl Brown and I l a Dell Brovn
Defendant, in the amount of S

plus costs of suit in the amount of S

That on the_!_J_lday nf
District nf

.

[

September

^tah

^ issued

a

:

19_£L, the United States District Court for i

sraxxr Judgment, Order of Fore- directing the Unil
c l o s u r e and Order of Sale

States Marshal to collect that judgment;
That on

4th

day of

October

^ 1Q91 , the United States Marshal did levy the sa:

Writ upon a certain tract or parcel, hereinafter described;
That the same tract or parcel of land was first advertised for sale by the United States Marshal accordto law, then sold at a public sale at

Richfiero^ Utah

Quinn Ghriatienaen

, who bid the highest and b

bid in the amount of S 5.000.00
jr^Qto therefor*,

I,

Eugene H. 1 Davis

, United States Marsh

by virtue of my office and according to law, in consideration of * 5,000.00
Quinn Christiensen

[

title, interest and claim which

# gnnU

m

hand paid to me
b a r g a in and sell all rij

L. Shyrl Brovn' and I l a Dell Brown

Defendant, had in the following tract or parcel of land:
Comm. a t a point 13.5 f t . E of SW Cor of Lot 1, Block 45, P l a t "A". Richfield Citv
Survey,

N 4 8 . 9 f t . . E 16 f t

8 i n . S 6fl.9

f t . . W 16 Ft- fl i n

, fn W

rnrH-a-fnJng

approximately 818 square feet, situated in the Northwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter of Section 25, Township 23 South. Range 3 West. Salt Lake B ^ p anH Mgr-ffHan.
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2S&-

Entry N6.
D^rHo^Hti

U 5 199^ At 3:25 D«n« 68

.Page.

Dorthy V. Henrie, Recorder Sevier County

tCfl ?)abE anb tO ?M&>

tr>pPthar unth , r r , l r t ^ ^ r g c ^ . ^ t n m Quinn Christiensen

and his/her heirs and assigns.

19.

3 n 12?ttncSS ^fjereof,
94

Ma

I have hereby set my hand and seal this . Z 2 ^ a y of

United States Marshal for theyDisirict of

Vl&h .

*

^h

'• 2

\2-

District of _Utah_
Markus B. Zimmer

. District of.

Court of the United States for the
do hereby certify, that

District

, Clerk of the.

Utah

Eugene H. Davis

the United States Marshal for the District of

Utah

whom I recognize as the United States Marshal, this*day personally appeared before me and acknowledged :h
he executed this Deed of Conve\ance as the United States Marshal, for the uses and purposes stated therein.
3$tl W\tW&& WfytXtOt,

I have hereby set my hand ar

affixed the SeaJ,of the -

D i s t r i c t Court

Court. at^rf

Salt Lake City

u

^T-

in the Disljtck nl A^tah
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this.

Hiynf March

1Q

?-

..Cer

R')

*59484
Leonard Shyrl Brown and Ila Dell Brown
COMMON LAW
490 North 100 West, Richfield, Utah 84701
COMMERCIAL LIEN
Demandants,
vs
SERVICE BY U.S.
Quinn Christensen, 155 South Old Hwy 89,
MAIL, CERTIFIED
Central Valley, Utah 84754
No. P 009 044 889
Respondent.
AMOUNT OF LIEN - $1,000.00 per day
This Common Law Commercial Lien is on all property owned or
jointly owned by Respondent Quinn Christensen or in which he
has rights, titles or interest within Sevier County, Utah,
together with all buildings, structures, sheds, improvements,
water, water rights, ditches, ditch rights, springs appurtenant
to or belonging to the described property.
Parcel 1. The Northeast quarter and the West Half of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 33, Township 23 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 240.0 acres.
Parcel 2. Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Section 28,
Township 23 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
and running thence West 20.0 chains; thence North 50.0 chains;
thence East 20.0 chains; thence South 50.0 chains to beginning,
containing 100.0 acres.
Parcel 3. Commencing at the Northeast Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 4, Township 24 South, Range 2 West, SLB&M;
and running thence South 20 chains, thence West 8 chains, thence
North 1.05 chains, thence North 70° 30' West 12.70 chains, thence
North 14.85 chains, thence East 20 chains to beginning.
Serial No. 4-279-6
Parcel 4. The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 33, Township 23 South, Range 2 West, SLB&M. Serial No.
4-229-5
Parcel 5. The East half of the Southwest Quarter of Section
33, Township 23 South, Rdnge 2 West SLB&M. Serial No. 4-2296
This lien is attached to*the above described property in
anticipation of a judgment to be secured by Demandants from
the Sixth District Court of Sevier County, State of Utah, Brown,
et al. v Christensen, Civil No. 940600108 QT, which Demandants
believe, in good faith, will be owned by Respondant.
Notice is hereby given to the Respondant that Demandants files
this Common Law Commercial Lien for the purpose of protecting
and securing the equitable interest the Demandants have in said
property. The cause for this action is as follows: Respondant
did, on or about 04/22/94, file a Criminal Trespass Complaint
with the Richfield City police. Officer V. Sickles, Richfield
City police, informed Leonard Brown by telephone and later Ila

280
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and Leonard Brown in person that if we entered the building
at 46 West 100 North, Richfield, Utah, we would be imprisoned.
The property is owned by Ila Brown by recorded deed since 1972.
Thus we have been unlawfully denied rights, possession, use
comfort and enjoyment of the property. The above civil action
is to quiet title in Ila Brown or in Leonard and Ila Brown,
we seek a judgment against Christensen for $1,000.00 per day
for each day we are denied property rights and estimate the
value in good faith.
The Respondant's rights and Waiver of Rights: Under the U.S.
constitution, Amendment 7, the Respondant may file a "Suit at
common Law, to remove this Lien. Under Common Law rules the
" " . n i u f t b e t r i e d before a Jury. No judge can act on a motion
to Dismiss or vacate this Lien, which would come from Chancery
°„^ ? ul . y ' a ? d a n v 3 ud 9 e w h o does so, acts without jurisdiction
and is immediately fully liable to Demandant for all damages
' ^ S
5 e 5 ein ! S a i d J u r v Trial cannot allow Motions in Limine
or Directed Verdicts, as they were not allowed under Common
f^; K **?? evenJ: t h a t t h e Respondant fails to challenge this
ii«» 5
i i ng a S u i t a t C o m m °n Law," within ninety (90) days
f S™ 5 - d ! fc ?. of s e r v i ce of this Lien, this Lien shall become
L S " fh?T i e n : ,? h ? uld t h e Respondant file a "Suit at Common
Y S
Ve fUl1 P W e r to sustain
this Li
°
' n>odify or vacate
DAT£D: this Sth Da

of May, 1994.

.

Leonard Shy

Demandant
Ila Dell Brown, Demandant
AFFIDAVIT
I, Leonard Shyrl Brown and If Ila Dell Brown, being duly sworn
on Oath affirm that all information and statements in the Common
Law Lien and attached paper are true and correct, to the best
of my knowledge and belief. All statements made herein are
made, in good faith and in the interest of justice.
j
Leonard

Ila Dell Brown

State of Utah
ss

County of Sevier

Subscribed and sworn to before me this S

Day of May, 1994,
j^

Notaryy P u b l i c

<

,

"NSTASTPUBLIC

Donna Greenhalgh

Entry No.

2

™8*

MB

Book 287_

p^nrriftHrffiY 0 5 19&At 9750 Pngo Tan

Dorthy V. Henrie, Recorder Sevier County
Request Of

L

-

s

- Brown

I

310 South Main. Sutta 3oa
Satt u n a City. Utah 84101
My Commltaloa Eaplraa
Auguat 13,1t96

STATE Or UTAH

1

Fee?18-00

281 - / [ ?
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(MEMORANDUM OF COMMON LAM

1.
The common law' I s a l l the statutory and case law background of England and
the American Colonies before the American Revolution. As distinguished from law created
by enactment of l e g i s l a t u r e s , the common law comprises, with the body o f those
principles and rules of a c t i o n , r e l a t i n g to the government and security of persons
and property, which derive t h e i r authority solely from usages and custom o f
immemorial a n t i q u i t y . . . p a r t i c u l a r l y the ancient unwritten law of England." Black's
Law Dictionary. 5th E d i t i o n , 1979.
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APPENDIX A-7

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

LEONARD SHYRL BROWN AND
ILA DELL BROWN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case NO. 940693-CA

-vsPriority No. 12
QUINN CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

AFFIDAVIT OF TEX R. OLSEN IN SUPPORT
OF COSTS AND EXPENSES
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
COUNTY OF SEVIER )
TEX R. OLSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

He is the attorney for Defendant-Appellee, Quinn

Christensen in these proceedings and has personal knowledge of
costs and expenses incurred.
2.

Since the conclusion of the proceedings in the

District Court, Appellee has incurred the following:
Date

Work Completed

11-23-94

Complete review of documents
filed with Supreme Court by
Brown and securing Court record;
review of entire record; case
review on questions of jurisdiction
and collateral judgment
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Hours

6

reaeral District Court; research
concerning authority of United States
of America through the Department of
Internal Revenue to use Federal District
Court; review of Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure
4
11-29/30-94

Writing brief on appeal for
Appellee, including preparing
Appendix, indexing the record

8

Attorney fees charged Appellee
at the rate of $100 per hour
which is a reasonable rate for
the work requested

$2000.00

Expenses Incurred:
15 copies of Appellee's Brief
printed; brief with appendix
includes 43 pages at $3.00
per page

$ 129.00

Anticipated Costs and Expenses:
Oral argument and travel from
Richfield to SLC and return, 330
miles (8 hours)
(330 § .25 per mile)

$ 800.00
$ 82.50

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES: $3011.15
DATED this

/

day of December, 1994.

Tex R. Olsen
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public,
on this day and year first above written. ,,

^

Notary Public
Residing At: Richfield, Utah
My Commission Expires: 7-10-95
OJENDAL NELSON
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